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IN June, 1893, a paper was printed by the AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER AND REVIEW, p. 594, on the subject of
Constitutional Law. The attempt was there made to point'
out what was the ground on which the courts have under-
'We feel confident that the members of the bar will feel deeply
interested in the criticism of the present rather popular theory of con-
stitutional lawwhich causes courts to set aside the acts of the legislatures
for unconstitutionality; not on the ground that any clause in the con-
stitution of the State can be pointed to which prohibits the legislation,
but that the legislation being contrary to some of the fundamental prin-
ciples of our political institutions, the power to pass the law has never
been conferred on the legislature by the constitution.
This article by Mr. MCMURTRIB is an attack on the doctrine
referred to, mainly on the ground that what are the fundamental
principles of our institutions, except when they are expressly set
forth in a Bill of Rights of a written constitution, are so indefinite that
the judge, in declaring a law unconstitutional on this ground, does not
apply definite principles of law, but rather sets himself up as the sole
and final judge of the law's expediency. In other words, that the judge
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taken to assume the power and the right of disregarding
a legislative enactment because it is unconstitutional.
This power, justified as it is by the Supreme Court on the
* famous judgment of Chief Justice MARsHALL, in Marbury
v. Madison,' has never been, and certainly cannot be, con-
troverted successfully. It is on p. 176 that the whole sub-
ject is reduced to this--the ConstitutioJi is the superior
- paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means; and, as
it is a question for the -judicial department to say what the
law is, it must determine which prevails if there is a con-
flict, just as it does-in case of conflicting statutes or by-laws
of 'a corporation that are contrary to law. This [ower
is rested on. the fact that the Constitution is written. The
Chief Justice then quotes what seems to be rather a
, weighty and pregnant sentence from the Constitution as
the justification for the assumption of the power-the judi-
cial Power shall extend to all cases arising under the Con-
stitution.
It is, therefore, very clear that the power asserted for
the judiciary to disregard legislative enactments was by
that judge; who was more of a statesman than lawyer,
referred to the document or writing called the Constitution,
and whenever that word is used that document is the thing
intended, and no other system of ethics or national institu-
tions or modes of thought or political theories with which
the law under consideration is alleged to conflict. Such a
power is not merely essentially judicial, but essentially
vested in the judiciary-or the Constitution that confers or
restrains the legislative power becomes merely directory
And absolutely incapable of being enfoiced. Up to this
in declaring the law unconstitutional, because against the fundamental
principles of the social compact, performs a legislative rather than a
judicial act.
Those who are interested in the controversy can find these questions
discussed from another standpoint in the " _ditorial Notes" of the
AMRICnAN LAW REGISThR AND RIvinw for August (p. 782), October
(p. 971), and November (p. IO64).
W. D. L.
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point since that judgment there has probably been no
dissent that carries any weight from the claim of the judi-
ciary. This was in 1803. Before that time there had been
an assertion by a very able man in the same court of the
existence of a limitation on the legislative powers as well
as rights of a very different character, and of the power or
right of the judiciary to determine this. The judgment
of CHASE, J., in Calder v. Bull,' should be read to appreciate
this. What this limitation is, where it is to be found, how
it is to be ascertained is there stated with probably all the
force that is possibl and with all the clearness and cer-
tainty..
And what is this limitation of the power of a State-
the social comfiact ? Have any two men agreed as to what
that was? Has any one even pretended that it ever had or
by possibility could have had an actual existence?
Reduce the proposition to writing and insert it in the
Bill of Rights, and could there be found a respectable
minority, nay could there be found one man that would
consent to thus transfer the sovereignty of the nation from
its representatives to a court by enacting that all legislation
contrary to the said compfact shall be void, and what that
compact is the judges shall be the final arbitrators, and they
are to ascertain itfrom their own notions as to what it ought
to be assumed to have been.
It has been many years since that remarkable contract
has been seriously referred to in anything I have read, and
never have I heard it mentioned except in ridicule of the
minds that could invent such trash. It is, therefore, not
worth while spending time upon it.
The most recent utterance in the same direction that
can carry force is that of FULLER, C. J.,1" when he says:
IIrrespective of the operation of the Federal Constitution
anc restrictions asserted to be inherent in the nature of
American institutions, the general rule is that there are no
'3 Dall., 386.
2 148 U. S., 661.
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limitations upon"the legislative power of the iegislature of
the State, except those imposed by its written constitution."
Test this restricti6n by a clause in the Bill of Rights, as
the social compact was just now tested, and the result must
be the game.. Nor is any one justified in imputing this as
an opinion to the Chief Justice. He is speaking of assertions
" which can hardly be applicable to his own views.
There is a third illustration to be found in the dissent-
ing opinion of BREWER, J., in Budd v. New York." It is
,legislation 'that is described ashaternalgovernment, which
to him is odious, aiid just belowjiis dissent from the recog-
nition of the power of the State to regulate its internal
affairs is based on this, because the statute comhels service
"vithoul comhensation-that is, the State ig powerless to
compel property-owners to keep the side-walks clear of
snow or to serve gratis in any office. In this FIRLD and
BROWN JJ., concur., Surely the English Government
.to-day cannot be.said to be too absurd to be possible, and
yet their scheme very largely rests on this odious custom of
.compelling work without. pay. Mr. BuiRym thought it the
glory of the French. Yet Mr. J. BRXWER says that such
law is not witliin the power of a State, the constitution.
being silent.
It will be observed we are not dealing with- anything
in the Constitution of the United States, and outside of
that instrument one may ask where do these gentlemen
find th ir authority to pass a judicial sentence in the case.
Apart from that instrument their have no more power to
express an opinion than any other judge, and what they
say can have no more weight in the State courts than the
dictum of any other court of concurrent jurisdiction.
They have no right to express an opinion on the sub-
ject on appeals from a judgment of the State courts,
because their right is confined to alleged violations of the
Federal Constitution. They are confined to cases origin-
ating in the Federal courts, as matter of power as well as
1 143 U. S., 551.
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right, as to all matters involving the powers of the State
legislatures outside of the restraints of the Federal Con-
stitution.
It does, therefore, seem to be a little obtrusive to be
thus volunteering a suggestion which is about as remote
from their judicial office as can well be stated. They dis-
claim the right to say a word as to the meaning of the
written constitution of the States, and yet volunteer a
statement which many persons will assume to carry with it
the weight of a judgment of the court from which there
is no appeal. Let the action of this court in Satterlee v.
Matthew1 be compared with this dissenting declaration.
There the legislature divested a legal right to property
without compensation by giving effect to a contract in form
which when it was made was absolutely void, not voidable,
but void. It.was there said by this court that it had no
jurisdiction, and hence it declined interfering. This ap-
parent enormity of the legislature was perfectly just. It
made valid an actual contract by one perfectly competent
in fact, but.disabled by the most absolutely technical of all
rules of law-the contracting party was a married woman
and in theory of law had no will of her own. There is a
passage on p. 414 that shows how utterly different were the
rules in 1829 from those assumed in 1889 without appar-
ently even the consciousness that a doubt ever existed as to
the ppwers of the judiciary, much less that the court had
repudiated it expressly. When a sentence in the judgment
of Fletcher v. Peck, of the same tendency as that I have
cited from BREWER, J., was quoted, the reply which is
there assumed to be sufficient is-it is nowhere intimated in
that oinion that a State Statute which divests a vested right
is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and
unless that is so this C'ourt has no jurisdiction to re-examine
and reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court, which had
affirmed the power to exist in the legislature of the State
of divesting a legal right of property at its pleasure and
without compensation.
1 2 Pet., 380.
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It may be answered, and gentlemen holding the opinion
that to them is committed the power of determining
whether acts of legislative power are nullities because con-
trary to American institutions or as exercises of an odious
form of government or that can be stigmatized as paternal
,art certainly likely so to answer-" I am not bound by the
opinions of my predecessors; if I were there would be noth-
ing to do but to allege the constitution, and failing that I
w6uld be powerless.- It is therefore idle to discuss the
question of power." These gentlemen sit in a court from
which there is no appeal saving through the House to the
Senate as a court for trying an impeachment, and we may
be quite sure from past experience that this will never be
called into exercise for any §uch trifle as the exercise of a
jurisdiction in a private ease where it does'not exist. No
one engaged in public affairs apparently thinks this is
worthy of erious consideration.
It is, however, most fitting that there should be very
distinctly stated what are the consequences of this new
departure and of its supreme importance under our system.
It is a marked feature of the Constitution of the United
States, and probably of most of the States, that there is no
absolute restriction on the enactment of anything as law
other than the declmrations in the Constitution limiting the
legislative power. The veto power is probably never abso-
lute. The State speaks in this way and can speak
in this way only. The latter part of the sentence I am
. about to quote, probably, no one will dispute, that the legis-
lature is the subreme authority except as limited by the con-
stitution of the State and sovereignty f the Peofle is exercised
through their repiresentatives in the legislature, unless, by the
fundamental law, power is elsewhere reposed, F'UI.LER, C. J.
McPherson v. Blacker,1 that is so far as the capacity of a
State to speak or declare its will is concerned. No one
.will probably dispute this.
It is also clear that, excepting the jurisdiction as to all
1 46 U. S., 25.
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matters arising under the Federal Constitution, the judicial
power is not authorized to interfere in the question of
,bower, except by a necessary implication as demonstrated
in Marbury v. Madison, and on that ground only, viz.,
that the':e are two statutory enactments, one we call the
constitu zion which binds and limits the legislature, and if
their acts conflict with this they are not legal and the judi-
ciary, of necessity, must so decide when deciding the ques-
tion of law.
When the Constitution commands and prohibits, any-
thing contrary to these commands or prohibitions is void,
not voidable. It is like an unexecuted deed or will, or a
forged document: Naughton v. Selby.' When this occurs
we speak of the effect of the Constitution as sovereign.
It is the highest act of sovereignty that restricts the nation
itself in respect of the power to speak. It is. a self-imposed
restraint and the legislaturd and the courts are 'both ad-
dressed 'by the nation through that instrument. And when
the courts have exercised that power of disregarding legiila-
tion, it has always been conceived to be the highest
possible of their judicial functions.
Is this less an act of sovereignty when the will of the
nation in the only way it can express itself is disregarded,
and required by all to be disregarded as an act of usurpa-
tion because it has violated some other code of political
ethics? And is there a possible escape from the conclusion
that the persons by whom this can be effectually done, in
fact, exercise the sovereignty of the State? Do they not
establish the law, not only without the aid of the legisla-
tive power, but in spite of it?
It is quite impossible that anything new in the form
of argument or suggestion or illustration, ban be presented
to minds such as they must possess who occupy the place
of justices of the Supreme Court. We are dealing with
the very first and most elementary principles of a govern-
ment that has been adm'nistered for a century, and with a
question mooted before the government was organized.
1 xi8 U. S., 425.
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The claim that is now set up was advanced three centuries
ago, and having been maintained by the most profound
and arrogant of lawyers, it had been abandoned long before
the foundations of our existing system were laid and it is
referred to only because it serves as the examfi/e of what
constitutes the sovereignty of the nation. What is said by
Mr. GARDINER in his "History of England," Vol. III, p.
2-7, and the passage from DE TOQUMLLE,' there extracted
will to all reasonable men demonstrate that upon this
theory and that by implication and without a word in any
constitution or act of government or of the people to war-
rant it, the body of men selected to determine what is the
-law are endowed with the power of making, as well as con-
,struipg, the law to the extent of prohibiting legislation and
that to the exclusion of all right of interference.by any
legislative power of the nation. For it is this that claim is
-a claim to declare a rule of law to exist which 'te nation
cann'ot alter. DEToQUEvILLE asserts this even of a written
constitution. GARnINRR says of Cox that where pre-
cedent failed he had recourse to the invention of a principle
to justify him in deciding as he pleased (p. 6).2
We have but to test this by assuming there had
been inserted in the Constitution as proposed an authority
for the President with the consent of the Senate to organize
such a body of nine men with a life tenure and ask how
would the propiosition have been received, to appreciate the
absolute absurdity of the claim.
If we turn to page 550, of 143 United States, it would
really seem that Mr. Justice BReWeR, and the two who
agreed with him, are of opinion that Mr. JEFERSON'S
assertions in the Declaration of Independence, that there
is an inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, are really foundations on which one may securely
rest when testing the -validity of a statute. He tells us
that governments were instituted to secure, not to create
these.
Dem. en Amerique, Vol. I.
2 The point this is quoted for is to determine where sovereignty lies.
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That all this is absolute truth to the legislator, though
rather puerile, just as it is true that foolish and silly, or
cruel and wicked laws should not be passed, is self-evident,
but to say that legislation is void if I think it silly or foolish
is absurd, and it is not material whether it is the judges or
any one else who are to possess the power, for every one at
his peril must determine this question when called on to
act under any statute, for of necessity it is a law, or it is a
nullity ab initio.
What wdould be thought of the claim to enforce BLACK-
STONV'S definitions of municipal law as we do what we call
constitittional restrictions, and give to the courts the power
to disregard all law that does not command what is right,
andfirohibit what is wrong, as if that were not the defini-
tion of what ought to be, not of what can be enacted. Will
the common law stand this test?
It is not inconsistent that a court which cannot even
inquire if a law is unconstitutional when sitting on appeal
from a State court should have the power to disregard a law
where the constitution is silent, and declare it is a nullity,
and is not this absurd ? And is it not clear -that any sys-
tem of words or ideas which restricts or limits, or confines
the legislative. fiower of the State is ex vi lermini its con-
stitution ; and is it more or less its cbnstitutilon, whether it
be written or unwritten? Surely it is the power and not
the paper or the writing which is the constitution. And
if the unwritten system of judicial ethics is a part of the
constitution, for the purpose of restricting the legislative
powers of the State, a court of error certainly, if not all
courts, and even all men, are authorized to enunciate rules
of constitutional law from time to time. Courts of error
doing this without appeal, other courts and -private men at
their peril, the one by impeachment, the other by indict-
ment or action.
Can anything exceed for extravagance in political
science the assertion of there being in America an unwrit-
ten, undefined constitution which binds the State itself?
For if the legislative power of the State is thus bound
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is it theless so when it is used to frame a written consti-
tution-?
Can anything illustrate this better than the oleomar-
garine'legislation which has met the approval of this court
'without dissent? There is -a prohibition to make and sell
food, professedly founded on an assertion by a legislature
that it is unwholesome. The assertion is conclusive of
this fact says this court.' Is there one man so ignorant
as not to know this is without any foundation in fact,
that it is as untrue as were the recitals in Henry the VIII
divorce acts. That the French Government should have,
with the aid of its scientific men, invented and used an
article of 'food for its army that is unwholesome is too
absurd for discussion. Nor could any one who inquired
how. the food is made possibly believe that the manu-
factory could convert suet into poison. Every one knows
it is the dairymen, who by combining got the legisla-
tion, and now enforce it by their paid attorneys. But
we have here a picture lesson that is better than any
abstract of argument as to what inconsistencies men's minds
are capable of when the pursuit of happiness is solemnly
declared to be inalienable, but it does not extend to making
imitation butter for use as an article of food because that
lessens the profits of the dairymen.
But, really, *hen we hear it stated by a jurist that the
fiursuil of haApiness is inalienable as a pro5osi2ion of law,
that is that a man cannot contract himself out of the legal
right, nor can the State narrow it, it must be admitted that
there is no standard more certain than the mere caprice of a
tyrant for determining what is and what is not within the,
legislative power in America. And the evil is aggravated
- not lessened by the fact that the decision of caprice cannot
be ascertained when the form of the law is adopted, and
men are subjected to its penalties.
The mistake is in forgetting that the legislature within
the limits of its powers is the final arbitrator of what is
I A recital as in an act of parliament is mere evidence. An enact-
ment is conclusive: I El. BI., 511.
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right or proper, and its jpower extends to determining what
are the proper limits of the natural rights of pursuing
happiness, exercising liberty and even retaining life, or it
ceases to be sovereign, and this legislative power is trans-
ferred to the court.
It may possibly assist some persons in appreciating the
importance of this subject to state some of the objections
to the jurisdicti6n.
(I) To say that it is usurpation is, of course, begging
the question in the eyes of the those who claim it. But it
lies on the claimant to justify. It certainly does not arise
out of the power to determine constitutional questions, 'for
ex-hypothesi, the constitution has nothing to do with the
matter. It also seems that the laborious demonstrationof the
power when there is a conflict with the constitution, implies
that it was thought by that court that it was this conflict
that gives the jurisdiction. It is difficult to suppose that
such men as sat in Marbury v. Madison would have deemed
the elaborate argument there put forth "to be necessary
or even pertinent, if any/king in legislation inconsistent
with the puerilities of the Declaration of Independence,
or what may be described as the social pact or as American
institutions, or as being an instance of paternal govern-
ment, is illegal and void.
(2) The consequences are theoretically appalling, and
practically as serious and ruinous as it is possible for any-
thing in the nature of law to be. An unconstitutional law
is a nullity ab initio. This is self-evident, but we have it
decided, Naughton v. Shelby,' and as this is so because of
illegality it is immaterial why the legislation was void.2
i18 U.S., 425.
2 It is proper to say that the Supreme Court of this State has recently
stated the rule to be that unconstitutional laws are valid until called in
question, and so are all acts done under them: Dunn v. Melton, 147 Pa.,
ii; King v. Philadelphia, 154 Pa., 16o. But when it is seen that it is
supposed that thefamiliarfirincile that acts of officials are not avoided
by reason of the illegality of their election or appointment governs the
case, it is not likely that such a doctrine'will be accepted elsewhere.
There is about the same connection between the principle and the
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How far-reaching this is. It certainly leaves room for
the gravest doubts whether a judge is protected, if he,
though unawares, acts on such a law. It is only necessary
to put a clear case and the difficulty is apparent, for can
there be a line drawn that separates the debatable from
the undebatable if it be a nullity? Then take the case of
a sentence'of death imposed under a statute that directs it
without trial or assigned cause. The sheriff certainly
could not justify the'execution of a man under a writ from
the chancery. Can the chancellor? 1
But if we look only to the possible and practical, con-
sider the effect on contracts, on titles, on ordinary conduct.
Chief Justice TILGHaMAN points out that all judgments of
the courts founded on such a law become void-that is, are
ascertained to have always been void, and this years after
every one has acted on them in perfect good faith. Some
can remember how this line of argument impressed us
when we learned, that the Missouri Compromise was un-
constitutional, and therefore that the men who framed it
were a mere parcel of ignoramuses, though they were the
most experienced statesmen and their condemners some-
thing very unlike statesmen.
1 (3) The uncertainties of law is a recognized misfortune,
but it is inherent in'the subject, and the attempts to cure
them by legislation are only proofs that they-are incurable.
Take, for instance, the attempt to define the outward and
visible tests of what is adverse possession and what is not.'
subject it is applied to as between the rule in Shelly's case and the rule
that a will must be proved before the register. Both are rules of law
and in this respect we have the authority of Captain Fluellan as a sup-
port for such a line of argument. But the one rule avoids what has
been supposed to be done but never was done because the power to do it
did not exist-the other requires the State to object and obtain a judg-
ment before the objection can be taken, and then it operates for the
future only. The quotation on page 168 assigns this very reason for the
later rule, and certainly this excludes its application to questions of.con-
stitutionality, for that requires that the State retains or holds the power
to elect, whether to ratify or avoid an unconstitutional law which is a
reductio ad absurdum.
'See 6 Car. and Pay., 249; Dicas v. Lord Brougham.
2 Dayman v. Moore, 9 Q- B., 555 ; Landsell v. Gowen, 17 Q. B., 589
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These instances show that if there be difficulty in
determining in a particular case what possession is adverse,
it is quite impossible to define it a firiori in any way that
does not involve the uncertain elements of the secret inten-
tion of the mind. Look again at the statutory attempt to
transfer the contract of a carrier by the transfer of the
right to receive under the bill of lading.'
If certainty is impossible in §uch cases, if the vies
that will be taken cannot be foreseen in such commonplace
cases as these, what is to become of us when the standard
has *never been defined in words and the mass of .mankind-
never heard of it, and when it is an even chance if any
two men would agree to any definite and accurate'state-
ment of the rule. Mr. Justice BpmwBR's standard, that
anything requiring service for the State without compeu'sa-
lion is counter to one-half the English system of govern-
ment, and even to that of Pennsylvania, for here, at least,'
we do compel offices requiring time, trouble and responsi-
bility to be filled, and that without compensation. -
It is sometimes said that the jurisdiction to determine
the validity of a statute rests in the fact that the powers
of the legislature are legislative, and that we must look to
the effect of the action of the legislature to determine
whether it is legislative, and a law that affects only A or
B by name is not a law at all.
Now, when we are dealing with such a subject as the
capacity of the State to declare its will-to establish rules
of conduct, to determine which is right and what is wrong
-- one may ask with considerable confidence, can this have
been the intention of the nation? The makers of all con-.
stitutions on this side of the Atlantic were dealing with
and for a civilized State having already a conslitution, and
by that constitution a State speaking through the legisla-
ture was unrestrained. It undoubtedly could, by the action
of the legislature in the form of a statute, take life and
property without inquiry, notice or trial-and they did it-
and no one has ever questioned the validity of these acts
I Sewell v. Burdick, io Ap. Cases, 74.
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of tyranny. It could do anything in the way of dealing
with persons, ri'hits and property that could be done by
prospective lkgislation and formal trials in pursuance of
those laws. It could .divest one man of ownership and vest
it in another, and that from mere caprice.
Certainly this was the constitution prior to 1776, at
least, in Pennsylvatia.
It is also quite clear that the constitutions very soon
recognized the evil and provided a remedy so far as it
was deemed proper. Is it possible with any fairness to
assert that it was the intention of the State when it
adopted the constitution to confer on the judiciary the
.power to veto any law which by a process of reasoning
could be said not to be within the legislative powers con-
ferred on a legislature according to the scientific meaning
of the word legislation, and that they put forth these
. specific restrictions only as guides or finger-posts for the
- judiciary?
Is this standard any better, as a rule, than the imag-
Sinary one of the social paet ' But, there is another aspect
of the same fact. The revolution of 1776 was described
by the late Mr. MEREDITH in a remarkable argument
bearing on this very question. A conveyancer suggested
a doubt as to the, power of the legislature to confer a
power of sale on a trustee under a will which had created
life estates with remainders, that made the ownership
uncertain for years and therefore a sale impossible; and
there is little room to doubt that the testator meant to
compel the property to be held in specie. He was insisting
that we inherited the constitution of our ancestors, and
under that the custom had. been uniform. In demonstrat-
ing this he said " Revolution !I" It was no revolution ; it
was but a severance of the umbilical cord which bound
the child to the mother.
It is this view of our system which separates our race
-from that which about the same period on the other side
of the channel began its career of constitution making.
One grew as a plant, the other was manufactured out of
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cobwebs of the mind. , It is iothing to the purpose that
these cobwebs are brilliant while the plant is dull and ap-
parently immovable. It is quite clear to my mind that, if
we are dealing with a question of power, the conferring on
a trustee the right to sell and convey must be irrespective
of the use made of the price. The right to convey is one
thing, the power is another. It is clear this is so under all
wills and deeds. The conveyance is not the less void for
want of power, whateveri may be the use made of the price,.
till the equitable owner ratifies by acceptance. And what
sort of notions of legislation must they be which recognize
the right to confer the authority on A to sell-B's property
without consulting him as a legitimate act of legislation,
but denies the power to enact a law if it applies to one
person only? Such notions are out of place for the
conclusive reason that they furnish no basis more definite
than arbitrary caprice, and it is certain, whatever folly in
constitution making may have been committed, no one has
- ever intended to confer this power on the judiciary.
What. is, then, to become of the nation which has suf-
rendered its most beneficent sovereignty, as far as it makr
clash with an imaginary contract, or with the unwritten
institutions of a country certainly not a century old, or
when liable to be stigmatized as a fiaternal act? And to
give particular instances, I would ask, does anything savor-
more of the paternal than interfering in respect of contracts
because of the assumed inability of men to protect them-
selves; and what are the statutes regulating th6 enlistment
of seamen but one. of these, and what are all the regula-
tions for the protection of miners, and the enlargement of
the employers' liability, but instances? Are not usury
laws, and the doctrine of courts of equity as to redemption
of mortgages, and countless other rules. under which we
live, all instances? And can it be possible to believe that
any nation intentionally surrendered the right of self-gov-
ernment in all this class of subjects, and that five out of
nine men can be allowed to exercise such a power?
To summarize: i) It is plain that sovereignty rests
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in those who can establish and enforce their rule of law.
(2). The judiciary confessedly possess this power to the ex-
tent of declaring the meaning and determining the effect of
constitutional restrictions or directions. (3) They also pos-
sess it in respect of all unwritten law, and in their right to
determine the meaning of written law. But this is.held
in check by the capacity 6f the State to change the law, or
to give another meaning to the law for the future at least.
Up to thi point, if there be .aflything objectionable,
no one probably can suggest a better scheme to secure lib-
erty and avoid anar chy.
The point of the new scheme is that there is thus cre-
ated a class of rules which the legislature is powerless to
change, and what these are rests with the judiciary to state
from time to time.
This, it appears to me, is the usurpation of sovereignty
without even a colorable warrant, and it also appears to be
of sufficient importance to excuse the attempt to call atten-
tion to the claim, and to invite discussion if there is any
explanation or justification which may be given.
A remarkably competent critic on Prl>'s view of the law
of treason, which he proposed to apply to STRAFFORD, has
a sentence that seems to me most happily to apply to such
notions of constitutional law: "It has," he says, "the
incurable defect of want of definiteness" not curable by being
reduced to written words. What is such a power but sheer
tyranny, and-not the less so because it is wisely or benefi-
cently exercised?
